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The Economics of Aging*
Doomsday or Shangrila?
James H. Schulz 
Brandeis University
The well-known social commentator Gunnar Myrdal 
(1963), writing in the early Sixties, had this to say about the 
elderly in America:
The treatment of old people in America, many of 
whom have a hard life behind them, is 
remarkable. . . [This is illustrated by] the terrifying 
extent to which old people are left in poverty and 
destitution. ... It cannot possibly be the con 
sidered opinion of the majority of Americans that 
so many of those who in America are often called 
"senior citizens" should be left in misery, squalor, 
and often forbidding loneliness, unattended though 
they are in need of care. The situation is overripe 
for a radical reform of the old age security system.
Contrast Myrdal's comment with a recent story that ap 
peared in the Washington Post:
A new Census Bureau study shows that the elderly 
in this country are much better off than previously 
believed and, in fact, are better off than the average 
American. . . .
The article by Spencer Rich (1983) in the Washington Post 
goes on to describe how the per capita, after-tax income of
*This presentation was based on an article by James Schulz published in Charles M. Gaitz, 
et al., Aging 2000: Our Health Care Destiny, Vol. II (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1985), 
and is reprinted with permission.
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the elderly was $6,300 in 1980 versus $5,964 for the popula 
tion as a whole.
Looking at these new Census Bureau findings and a 
number of other recent studies, one can begin to see the 
outlines of a very fundamental change with regard to the 
economic status of the elderly. From a statistical point of 
view, the elderly in this country are beginning to look a lot 
like the rest of the population: some very rich, lots with ade 
quate income, lots more with very modest incomes (often 
near poverty), and a significant minority still destitute. This 
is very different from the past when most were destitute.
The past three decades have been marked by steady im 
provements in the economic situation of the elderly. Pension 
coverage has spread rapidly, real benefit levels have increas 
ed, and health protection is generally financially obtainable. 
Moreover, the general economic prosperity of the post- 
World War II period (that is, up until recently) has served to 
facilitate among those middle-aged and older the accumula 
tion of an impressive stock of economic wealth in the form 
of housing, durables, and pension accurals.
But just when we thought the problem of providing ade 
quate income in retirement for most elderly was solved, a 
whole new set of uncertainties arose:
1. Life-Threatening Economic Instability. I say "life- 
threatening" as a way of dramatizing the differences in the 
character of the macro problems that suddenly appeared in 
the Seventies. Inflation and unemployment unexpectedly 
became both more severe and of longer duration—to the ex 
tent that the resulting economic deprivation, mental stress, 
inadequate medical care, and malnutrition threatened life 
itself for a much broader spectrum of the American popula 
tion.
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As families attempted to cope with the harsh realities of 
this economic instability, few realized (or had the time or in 
clination to think about) the simultaneous erosion of the 
base for their retirement security that was also occurring. 
Wealth in housing and consumer durables deteriorated. And 
a private pension system, designed to reward long-term 
workers at the expense of those who lose or change jobs, 
proceeded to wipe out billions of dollars in potential pension 
accruals as millions of workers changed jobs without vested 
pension rights. And probably what is more serious is the 
gradual, invisible erosion of pension benefit rights that will 
take place over the coming years. The forced mobility of the 
Seventies and Eighties also produced a gigantic pool of pen 
sion benefit accruals for those job changers fortunate 
enough to be eligible for vesting. But since these accruals are 
not indexed, they are highly vulnerable to monetary 
depreciation from the inflation that can be expected in the 
years ahead. Few people today (even policymakers) are sen 
sitive to this problem. Few see that this is the great retirement 
"legacy" of the Carter-Reagan years: lost pension benefits. 
Instead, most attention has been focused on social security, 
the next uncertainty to be discussed.
2. Chaotic Social Security Financing. It is almost amusing 
to look back over the social security events of the recent past: 
a nation bumbling along from one social security financial 
crisis to another, like a little mom and pop grocery store 
always on the brink of bankruptcy. What we have witnessed 
is one of the great social programs of the richest country in 
the world seemingly almost brought to its knees by the 
economic instability discussed above. The result: cries of 
anguish, much handwringing, and finally a financial "fix" 
until the next crisis arises.
To me, a pension expert who has given years of attention 
to pension financing issues, events seem more the result of
44
political maneuvering than the product of fundamental 
economic problems. But to others, the problems (both 
economic and political) seem very real. And for the first time 
since it was established, support for social security seems in 
doubt as confidence deteriorates among policymakers and 
program participants. What was once unthinkable—major 
cutbacks—have become a reality: benefit cuts, benefit taxa 
tion, and a scheduled rise in the retirement age.
For purposes of this paper, then, it only remains to ask the 
question: if social security is in a state of change, what can be 
counted on? Obviously this new uncertainty makes it dif 
ficult to plan for the future.
3. The Early Retirement Bomb. For many years now 
analysts have pointed with great anxiety to the dramatic 
declines in labor force participation among the older popula 
tion. For reasons we summarize below, many have referred 
to this social phenomenon as a ticking bomb that might ex 
plode in the nation's face at some future time.
It is important to distinguish the growing interest and 
ability to retire in general from the phenomenon of exercis 
ing the retirement option at increasingly early ages. The 
"right to retire" is not what is at issue. Rather the issue is the 
age of election and who will pay the costs. For example, ac 
tuaries point out that pension costs increase by about 50 per 
cent once the normal age of retirement is reduced from age 
65 to age 60.
Yet, throughout the country, powerful forces are at work 
to remove people from the labor force before age 65. In 
creasing numbers of workers are retiring under the social 
security early retirement option. Federal employees can 
retire on full benefits at age 55 with 30 years of service; in 
fact, the President's Commission on Pension Policy reported 
that 59 percent of retiring male civil service servants (fiscal
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1978) were age 60 or younger. Most state and local govern 
ment employee plans also have very liberal retirement provi 
sions. Early retirement is usually possible after 20 to 30 years 
of service—often as early as age 50 or 55.
Less well known are the retirement options provided under 
private pension plans. The generous provisions of the big 
plans—for example, in the auto industry—are well known. 
Few data are published, however, on the hundreds of 
thousands of plans in other industries. One recent study of 
pension plans by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (1980), 
has found that more than half of covered workers were eligi 
ble to receive normal retirement benefits before age 65. And 
almost a third were eligible for normal benefits at age 60 or 
earlier!
Another study of defined benefit plans covering about 23 
million workers in 1974 (Schulz, et al., 1980) shows that 70 
percent of these workers were eligible for early retirement 
benefits at age 60 (provided service requirements, if any, 
were met). Over half could retire as early as age 55, and 15 
percent were in plans with even earlier eligibility ages (or no 
age requirement at all).
But these numbers do not tell the whole story. More than 
90 percent of all workers covered by private pensions are in 
plans having "early retirement" options. When a worker 
retires early, that is before the " normal" retirement age, the 
benefit is usually reduced. A large number of employers, 
however, encourage their employees to retire early by absorb 
ing some of the costs of paying pensions over a longer period 
of time. Thus, while some plans reduce benefits by the full 
actuarial discount, many plans, in effect, give actuarial 
bonuses to workers who retire early.
The study of defined benefit plans in 1974 indicated that 
powerful economic incentives are provided in many plans.
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For example, there were about seven million workers in 1974 
covered by plans permitting their retirement at age 60 with 
less than a full actuarial reduction in benefits.
Thus, we see that social security is not the sole force 
pushing workers into retirement. Certainly social security in 
come, when it becomes available, encourages workers to 
retire. But for many workers it is military, federal, 
state/local, or private plans that make it possible to retire at 
increasingly early ages.
Pensions have become an important tool of personnel 
management, especially in dealing with excess labor situa 
tions. As Juanita Kreps (1977) pointed out a few years ago, 
"retirement, a relatively new lifestage, has quickly become 
a ... device for balancing the number of job seekers with 
the demand for workers at going rates of pay." But make no 
mistake, early retirement is also very popular with unions 
and the workers themselves.
This trend of early retirement raises new uncertainties. To 
the extent that early retirement benefits are reduced benefits, 
will the resulting retirement income be adequate? Will the 
lower benefits ultimately trigger demands for higher ones? 
Will meeting the costs of paying pension benefits over in 
creasing periods of time create financing problems for public 
and private pension sponsors—threatening the viability of 
the pension plans themselves? Since the costs of early retire 
ment policies are relatively low but grow rapidly over time 
(as the trend continues and spreads), some see this situation 
akin to a quiet bomb that is currently dormant but capable 
of suddenly exploding sometime in the future. Already many 
see social security costs out of control. Concern about 
private pension costs may soon follow.
Given these uncertainties (economic instability, problems 
of social security financing, and the trend toward early 
retirement), what can we say about the future? Here we find
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very little agreement among analysts. Of course, such a state 
of affairs is not too surprising. We have learned not to be too 
surprised by the unpredictable, especially given the large 
number of unknown factors surrounding a social 
phenomenon like "the economics of aging." Still, for those 
who have taken more than a passing interest in this area, the 
current situation represents a significant and somewhat 
unexpected watershed.
Some analysts see us at the beginning of a long period of 
economic stagnation and decline. Others see current 
economic problems as just another temporary setback in the 
long-run history of economic growth and the ever-rising pros 
perity that has characterized the American economy for 
more than a century. Economic policies for the aging and 
ultimately the future economic status of the aged depend 
critically on which viewpoint is the more realistic.
Rather than taking sides in this dispute, it may be more 
useful at this point to enumerate some of the key assump 
tions that lie behind the two very different points of view. 
Our ability to finance economic programs for the aged in 
future years will be influenced greatly by the following fac 
tors:
1. The Growth of Real Wages. Until the late Sixties the 
growth in American productivity was relatively high for 
most of the post-World War II period. Since then, however, 
the rate has slackened and in recent years the slowdown has 
been quite dramatic. Moreover, this downturn has not been 
confined to a few special industries but has been experienced 
by a very broad spectrum of industries in the United States. 
Despite much research, economists have not been able to 
satisfactorily explain the changes in productivity that have 
taken place and, as a result, there is currently a great deal of 
uncertainty with regard to what is likely to happen in the 
years ahead.
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Pessimistic projections generally assume that recent ex 
perience results from fundamental changes in the economy 
that are not likely to change quickly. They therefore assume 
that real wage increases based on productivity gains will be 
very low, averaging significantly less than 1.0 percent per 
year.
Optimistic projections, in contrast, assume that the recent 
experience is transient and in large part associated with the 
unexpected economic shocks of the last couple of 
decades—war, OPEC, crop failures, etc. These projections 
assume a return to rates closer to those of the 1940-60 period 
and real wages soon increasing between 1.0 and 2.0 percent 
per year.
2. Unemployment. Intimately relatd to productivity and 
growth is the level of employment. In addition to the general 
economic stagnation depressing employment opportunities, 
pessimists point to an apparent increase in structural prob 
lems associated with the American labor force as its age, sex, 
and race composition changes dramatically and as we shift 
away from manufacturing production and toward services. 
Thus, pessimistic projections assume unemployment will not 
decline to the earlier low levels but will range between 6 and 8 
percent (high by historical standards). Optimistic projections 
assume rates only slightly higher than those of "better 
times"—declining to below 6 percent.
3. Fertility Rates and Mortality. We have witnessed wide 
fluctuations in fertility over the past century, creating an 
unevenness in the population structure and resulting dif 
ficulties in planning (for housing, schools, pensions, etc.) 
The sharp decline in fertility following the "baby boom" of 
the late Forties and early Fifties is currently the cause of 
serious concern with regard to the costs of the elderly 
population in the 21st century. But trends in fertility over the 
next several decades are also important, since they will in
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great part determine the number of working-age persons 
available when the "baby boom" retires.
While most demographers continue to stress the volatility, 
and hence unpredictability, of future fertility, the projec 
tions we make now must guess as to the likely trends. 
Pessimistic projections assume that fertility will continue to 
fall to about 1.6-1.7 children per woman; while the op 
timistic ones assume fertility will increase slightly to 2.1-2.4 
births per woman. (All projections fail to include illegal im 
migration.)
Remaining life expectance at age 65 is currently about 18.0 
years for women and 14.0 years for men, up from 1940 by 
four and two years respectively. For projection purposes, the 
major breakthroughs in prolonging life that some predict are 
generally not made a part of the projections, and almost all 
projections generally assume some continuing but gradual 
improvement in mortaility experience at the later ages. Thus, 
the optimistic and pessimistic projections differ only by rate 
of improvement in life expectancy assumed, and this dif 
ference is typically small.
4. Private Pensions. Private pensions have grown 
dramatically during the post-World War II period—in 
coverage, in types of protection, and in benefit levels provid 
ed. Optimistic projections see this mechanism for income in 
old-age continuing to increase in importance. With liberaliz 
ed tax provisions for IRAs and a variety of new pension op 
tions (e.g., 401 (K) cash-or-deferred plans), private pension 
coverage—and hence pension benefits—are assumed to in 
crease significantly. In contrast, the pessimistic projections 
see pension coverage growing slowly (perhaps even declin 
ing) as a result of (a) government regulations which make 
pensions a much less flexible management tool and raise ad 
ministrative expenses, (b) higher benefit costs arising from 
continuing demands to liberalize benefits, and (c) escalating
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premiums to the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation to 
protect against plan termination resulting from industry, and 
hence plan, instability.
5. Health Care Costs. There is now growing awareness 
among analysts and policymakers that the rapid rise in 
health care costs of the recent past is not likely to abate in the 
years to come. With regard to the elderly, most of the atten 
tion is focused on Medicare, which currently finances about 
45 percent of their health care costs and most of acute care 
expenses. Since its enactment, Medicare expenditures have 
grown at a rate far faster than the other social security pro 
grams. In early 1983, the White House issued statistics to 
support President Reagan's "health care incentive reform 
proposal." "This year," said the fact sheet, "Medicare and 
Medicaid will spend more every two weeks than they did dur 
ing the entire year of 1966, their first full year of operation" 
(White House, 1983). If the early retirement bomb is 
threatening us, many would argue that the Medicare bomb 
has already exploded, and the only argument is over how 
many more will follow.
Moreover, there seems to be general agreement among 
analysts that, in the absence of intervention, Medicare costs 
will continue to accelerate in future years. And many think 
that only very fundamental and radical changes in our health 
care delivery system will have any appreciable effect on 
future costs trends. In their Annual Report for 1983, the 
Trustees of the Social Security Administration project ("im 
mediate" assumptions) that Medicare costs will continue 
to grow by 8 to 13 percent over the next two 
decades—significantly faster than the increase in revenues 
from taxable payrolls. The resulting costs (and deficits) are 
huge by any standard of comparison.
The Trustees attribute slightly over half of the annual 
growth in health costs to economic and demographic factors.
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But the rest is expected to result from the continuing cost 
pressures within the health care industry itself—wage setting, 
insurance disincentives, and the costs of new technology. 
Peterson (1983) warns, for example, that the "... new 
medical technologies are priming the HI [Medicare] program 
for a cost explosion without precedent. ..." And Alan 
Greenspan—testifying before the Subcommittee on Social 
Security, U.S. House Committee on Ways and Means 
(February 1, 1983) as Chairman of the National Commission 
on Social Security Reform—warns: "We cannot substantial 
ly constrain the cost of Medicare unless we slow the im 
provements in technology (a dubious goal) or choose not to 
employ the technology that is currently available. These deci 
sions, of course, would raise very difficult ethical and moral 
questions."
Again, projecting future costs becomes a seemingly im 
possible exercise. Munnell (1983), arguing against the 
pessimistic projections of Peterson, counters in the following 
way:
Outlays for HI [Medicare] today account for only 
18 percent of total expenditures under the social 
security program; it is difficult to believe that we 
will allow the HI program to grow to a point where 
the cost for hospital insurance (20 percent of tax 
able payrolls) roughly equals the total cost to sup 
port the aged, disabled, their dependents and sur 
vivors (24 percent of payrolls). [Emphasis added.]
Thus, given agreement over the need for cost constraint, the 
optimists and pessimists tend to differ on how soon and how 
much we will change our health care system.
It is tempting to close by throwing up one's hands in 
frustration and exclaiming, "Who knows what the future 
will bring?" As our survey of the key factors has shown,
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there is clearly much intellectual justification for uncertain 
ty—and anxiety!
Instead, I want to close by adding a reactive note of cau 
tion. In recent years, good economic news has been virtually 
nonexistent. For this and other reasons it is quite clear that 
the pessimistic projections and the problems they portend 
are being taken very seriously these days by "the people that 
count." Given the seriousness in recent years of our general 
economic problems and a number of major problems arising 
in connection with old-age and disability pensions, state and 
local pension financing, private pension reinsurance, and 
Medicare/Medicaid—the possibility of continuing and in 
creasing problems is not likely to be ignored.
And for a number of years now a variety of "solutions" 
or remedial steps have been proposed. The changes are 
almost all pointed in one direction—drastic cutbacks in 
benefits to reduce social security costs. As I have pointed out 
previously (Schluz 1983), the logical question that follows 
from such proposed action is: What else changes in reaction 
to cutbacks in social security (i.e., what takes the place of 
social security)?
In examining the ability of alternatives to pick up the slack 
from a pared down social security program, we should not 
ignore economic history. Despite what Martha Derthick 
(1979) says about bureaucratic elites engineering the expan 
sion of social security, the development of OASDHI was to a 
very large extent a reaction to the failure of the alter 
natives—namely "employment of the old" and "providing 
for old age through personal savings." Both these alter 
natives are largely untenable due to the vicissitudes of our 
economic system over the years:
a) past periods of unemployment and inflation that have 
made preparation for retirement (i.e., financial plan-
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ning) extremely difficult for individuals (if not im 
possible);
b) an inability to achieve sustained full 
employment—except in periods when the nation was 
preparing, fighting, or recovering from war—causing 
the government to actively discourage employment by 
older workers and to develop pension mechanisms 
that encourage retirement; and
c) both social security and private pensions with a long 
history as tools of business management to deal with 
cyclical and long-term shifts in demand (see, e.g., 
Graebner 1980).
What then are the alternatives proposed today? Not surpris 
ingly, we find that they are the same as in the past: private 
saving, private insurance, and employment of the old.
Thus, there is a high probability that the solutions being 
proposed today are simplistic and unworkable. If we cut 
back social security drastically, we are likely to see the 
economic status of the elderly decline over time. More im 
portant, this decline will fall disproportionately on the disad- 
vantaged segments of the population—low income persons, 
women, and minorities who now depend almost entirely on 
social security for their support in old age.
The long term implications of this are quite serious. As 
William Graebner has recently argued, the elderly may be 
viewed by our society as a residual group to remain in or 
move out of the labor force, according to the 
macroeconomic situation:
If elderly people of the turn of the century could 
compare notes with those of us approaching this 
century's end, the two generations might well con-
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elude that, whatever else has changed, the fate of 
the elderly remains the same: to serve the needs of 
other age groups and to be retired, or put back to 
work in the interest of someone else's conception of 
the general welfare (Graebner 1983).
If that is true, then it is quite unlikely that many people in the 
future can actually count on the rosy retirement period (the 
Shangrila) so much the fashion today in the stories of the 
media and the speeches of politicians.
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